

TOP SECRET

S d T

29 December 1961

25X1



The following evaluation of your assessment of S&T intelligence is offered with our full appreciation of the magnitude of the task assigned to your group and the significant implications of the recommendations it contains. We share your conclusion regarding major inadequacies in current U.S. intelligence on Soviet S&T capabilities and see these inadequacies as substantially contributing to a national security position which the President has characterized as unprecedented peril. For these reasons we are completely candid in our comments and trust they will be viewed as constructive, the spirit in which they are respectfully submitted.

Our understanding of the task assigned the Coordination Staff under USIB-D-34.4/1 is that of providing an early and thorough assessment of present U.S. intelligence collection, coordination and analysis relating to Bloc S&T, with recommendations for ameliorative action based thereon. Given this definition of task, our frank over-all evaluation of the document must be that actions recommended are not based on sufficiently precise delineation of specific inadequacies in the present S&T intelligence effort, and that, not being derived from analysis of the causes of present inadequacies, these recommendations are not likely to be ameliorative.

We strongly agree that an early and thorough assessment of S&T intelligence on the Soviet system is (and has been for some time) imperative, and that continuing comprehensive examination of community S&T intelligence is required. Our agreement is based in part on the view that much of East-West tension is attributable to the outdistancing of traditional modes of social control and international relations by accelerated S&T development the world-over, and in part on the fact that in our own contacts throughout the intelligence community we have duplicated in miniature the experience of your group in encountering indications of inadequacy and disorientation.

We would urge that continuing assessment be coupled with programmed reorientation of a number of community activities, in a planned effort to bring the whole of U.S. intelligence into an integrated and realistically coordinated operation, minimizing overlap, maximizing flexibility and facilitating production of intelligence of optimum utility to policy-makers.

In honesty we must state that the bulk of actions recommended by your group--which would commit a large portion of the intelligence community to specific tasks--do not, in our view, guarantee resolution of inadequacies. We find them essentially proposals for expansion of pre-existing intelligence activities which, per force, have contributed to these inadequacies. While such expansion may prove ameliorative in some respects, lack of holistic purview as the basis for their formulation gives little reason for confidence

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

in their effectiveness.

These recommendations (a, g, i and j) pertain almost exclusively to collection, largely neglecting inadequacies in processing and analysis of collected information. In actuality, we feel there is already a gross overload of information in the intelligence system--sufficient in itself to constitute an important cause of malfunction--and the key problems instead appear to relate to more expeditious data-reduction and more discriminating analysis, performed with the view to providing policy-makers with meaningful distillations of information in forms most conducive to realistic decision-making.

We disagree with the confidence expressed in intensified clandestine collection. Experience does not suggest that this would resolve inadequacies of any major sort. Moreover, we urge that "hard factual information on the policy, planning, research and design phases" in development of Soviet weaponry and other technology--information used by the Soviets themselves in these respects--is largely obtainable through overt channels. We see this aspect of intelligence inadequacy rather in terms of ineffective exploitation of these channels.

The crux of the matter, in our view, hinges on thorough diagnosis of the ills of current S&T intelligence. We feel that such diagnosis--even in an initial assessment--must be more profound if it is to serve as the foundation for action recommendations with such broad implications. We appreciate the haste with which it was necessary to prepare this document and the necessarily brief reconnaissance on which it was based. Additionally, we would not suggest that an extensive dissertation on intelligence philosophy be incorporated in your report. Nonetheless, we think it imperative that fundamental elements of such a philosophy be specified as criteria against which specific failings (or accomplishments) of S&T intelligence are being measured. We submit that basic objectives of S&T intelligence are not "to keep abreast of Soviet developments," nor "to detect and identify end products of the Soviet effort early in their test stages." We see these as near to last resorts. Instead we urge recommendations likely to increase predictive capability and estimative accuracy regarding the role of S&T in achievement of the total range of Soviet objectives--particular, national and global. Such recommendations, in our opinion, should stress reorientation of S&T intelligence toward reflection of the organization and function of the total Soviet system-- a system requiring the burial of the West for its own advanced development. Given clear insight into the needs and objectives of the Soviet system, plus knowledge of its resources and structure--all of which we see as available overtly--we feel it is possible to anticipate Soviet developments in probabilistic but sufficiently specific and dependable terms to enable formulation of suitable U.S. policy in advance of most events. To us this is a prime requirement if S&T initiative is to be gained and maintained in the West.

We see anticipatory intelligence as possible only insofar as the community operates on the fundamental premises that (a) the critical function of

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

strategic intelligence is predictive; and (b) that the Soviet system, or any prospering system, functions in regular, patterned and predictable ways in maintaining itself and achieving its goals--and that given adequate knowledge of the needs, means and ends of the system, its activity can be anticipated to a high and dependable degree. Specific and reliable information is readily available on Soviet resources (i.e., energy, materiel, technical know-how, emphases in research and theory, etc.), Soviet organization (i.e., capabilities for integrating and exploiting these resource potentialities), and on Soviet long-range ambitions (for development of its science, economy and defense, for transformation of its society, and for construction of world communism). The key problems lie in tapping and analyzing such information in accord with a philosophy of intelligence function and purpose understood and adopted community-wide. Discriminating collection based on such a philosophy--and not expanded collection per se--is, we feel, the first major requirement in ameliorating present inadequacies. Intelligence analysis in the same framework is logically the second.

Having specified criteria against which current intelligence collection, processing and analysis are assessed we feel these same criteria should become the basis for the report's assessment of specific instances in which the on-going S&T intelligence activity is or is not properly focused and deployed. We see the Coordination Staff not in a fact-finding role, but increasingly as the governor (in a cybernetic systems sense) of a flexible intelligence process characterized by a sharing of procedural concepts, high coordination of resources and production, and an essentially reflective and predictive orientation.

To summarize, we feel that the report should (1) develop and present the elements of a philosophy of S&T intelligence, specifying what it is, why it is necessary and what functions it must perform; (2) that criteria derived from this philosophy be made the basis of assessment of inadequacies in S&T intelligence; and (3) that recommendations for reorientation and modification of intelligence collection, processing and analysis in this way follow from objectives of the stated philosophy. In our view nothing less than this would meet the USIB request or the recognized intelligence deficiencies which engendered it.

We would deem it a privilege to cooperate further with you and your group in any way you feel desirable. If you consider that our assistance in modification of the report or in any activities connected with it would be useful, it would perhaps be appropriate to suggest to the AD/OSI that allocation of a week or two of our time be approved for the purpose.

Our principal concern in the foregoing has been S&T intelligence in broad context. Under the heading of more conventional editorial suggestions the following may be worth noting:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET


- 4 -

Action c:




25X1

Action d:

 is prepared to procure Soviet materials of almost any type, including electronic computers.

Action l:

We have furnished S&T intelligence to DOD for some time on an informal basis (Assistant Secretary for R&D, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, General Trudeau of Army R&D,  of DIA, etc.). Greater transfer of such information awaits CIA addressing itself to problems of more general significance.

25X1

Action m:

Rosters of scientists and technicians are available in such compilations as American Men of Sciences, and in lists maintained by NSF and professional organizations. More restricted listings seem insufficient in view of purposes they would serve. Actually, however, we believe more important questions are how non-government S&T consultants and contractors are selected; how their efforts are directed, supported and coordinated; and particularly how necessary information is disseminated to them.



25X1

TOP SECRET